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REVISITING U.S. LABOR LAW AS A
RESTRICTION TO WORKS COUNCILS:
A KEY FOR U.S. GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS
Neil Bucklew, * Nicholas DiGiovanni Jr., Esq., ** Jeffery D.
Houghton, *** & Anne Marie Lofaso****
ABSTRACT
Works councils, institutionalized bodies that facilitate representative
communication between an employer and its employees, have expanded on a
global scale in recent decades due, in large part, to their ability to increase
employee representation, firm productivity and profitability, and social
responsiveness. The United States has been notably absent from the global works-
councils movement primarily because of an outdated, New Deal-era labor-
relations system that generally prohibits these types of worker participation
structures. The Authors provide a detailed overview of U.S. labor law in relation
to works councils before presenting three contrasting options for increasing
worker participation in the United States via works councils, thereby increasing
U.S. global competitiveness.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the fall of 2013, famed, German-owned automobile manufacturer,
Volkswagen AG, and the United Automobile Workers of America (UAW)
Union captured international headlines when they announced they were
working toward unionizing an automobile plant in Chattanooga, Tennessee,
for the express purpose of establishing a German-style works council.' This
story was newsworthy because the United States, which has one of the lowest
union-density rates of all western democracies,2 also has no works councils.
Relatedly, the article indicated labor and management intended to
1. See Steven Greenhouse, VW and Its Workers Explore a Union at a Tennessee
Plant, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/07/business/vw-and-
auto-workers-explore-union-at-tennessee-plant.html.
2. See, e.g., OECD, OECD EMPLOYMENT OUTLOOK 2017, at 134 (2017),
http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/employment/oecd-
employment-outlook-2017 emploutlook-2017-en#pagel34. According to the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), union density
averages approximately 17 percent across the thirty-five OECD countries, ranging from
an approximate low of 4.5 percent in Estonia to 92 percent in Iceland. Id. According to
a Forbes magazine article based on OECD union-density figures, the United States'
then-10.6 percent union membership ranked 13th of 15 OECD countries surveyed. Niall
McCarthy, Which Countries Have the Highest Levels of Labor Union Membership?,
FORBES (June 20, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/2017/06/20/which-
countries-have-the-highest-levels-of-labor-union-membership-infographic/
#3c2ff8c733c0.
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cooperate.3 In a statement released on September 6, 2013, UAW President
Bob King remarked:
VW workers in Chattanooga have the unique opportunity to
introduce this new model of labor relations to the United States, in
partnership with the U.A.W. Such a labor relations model would give
workers the job security that would accompany their having an integral
role in managing the company and a vehicle to provide input on
workplace improvements that will contribute to the company's success.4
Volkswagen employees ultimately rejected the union in a 712-626 vote
against unionization.5 The vote may not seem like a close election, given the
fact management did not even oppose the union, but the political
atmosphere complicated that conclusion.6 Tennessee's Governor, Bill
Haslam, and Chattanooga's former mayor, U.S. Senator Bob Corker, came
out early against the union.7 For example, Governor Haslam claimed: "One
of the reasons is, we've had several prospective companies say that decision
will impact whether we choose Tennessee or somewhere else."'8 Senator
Corker called Volkswagen the "'laughing stock' of the business world" for
failing to oppose the union and blaming the UAW for the auto industry's
troubles.9
While there appears to be an ideological divide between Republicans
and Democrats regarding unions, no such divide has emerged regarding
works councils, institutionalized bodies that facilitate representative
communication between an employer and its employees.'0 Perhaps this can
3. See Greenhouse, supra note 1.
4. UAW Statement on VW Works Council in Chattanooga, UAW (Sept. 6, 2013),
https://uaw.org/uaw-statement-on-vw-works-council-in-chattanooga/.
5. Chris Isidore, Volkswagon Employees Say 'No' to United Auto Workers in
Tennessee, CNN (Feb. 15, 2014), https://www.cnn.com!2014/02/14/us/tennessee-vw-
union-vote/index.html.
6. Id.
7. Blake Farmer, Volkswagon Union Opposed by Tennessee Republican Officials,




10. See Joel Rogers & Wolfgang Streeck, The Study of Works Councils: Concepts
and Problems, in WORKS COUNCILS: CONSULTATION, REPRESENTATION, AND




be attributed to the lack of works councils in the United States. However,
the lack of opposition to works councils may also be attributable to the fact
that, unlike unions which assume an adversarial relationship between
workers and employers, works councils depend on cooperation. This
cooperative and even collaborative model may be more compatible with
U.S.-style capitalism.
Although one of the more important global trends in recent decades
has been a movement toward greater worker participation in the form of
works councils," the United States has not benefited from this trend. Rather,
the trend toward greater employee participation had its early origins in
Germany and the German Works Council Act of 1920,12 and the concept has
spread rapidly in recent decades as other counties have developed their own
versions of the process. Some form of works councils now exists in numerous
countries ranging from Japan3 to Argentina 4 to South Africa.
15 In the
European Union (EU), there are mandated European Works Councils for
any company with more than 1,000 employees and at least 150 employees in
each of two member countries.16 Additionally in 2002, another EU directive
11. See JEREMY WADDINGTON, EUROPEAN WORKS COUNCILS: A
TRANSNATIONAL INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS INSTITUTION IN THE MAKING 1 (2011).
12. Betriebsrategesetz [Works Council Act], Feb. 4, 1920, RGBL I at 147 (Ger.),
http://www.1000dokumente.de/pdf/dok0133-brg-de.pdf (valid in the Weimar Republic
of Germany from 1920 to 1934).
13. See generally Hisashi Takeuchi-Okuno, The System of Employee Representation
at the Enterprise in Japan, in 11 JAPAN INST. FOR LABOUR POL'Y & TRAINING, SYSTEM
OF EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION AT THE ENTERPRISE 1 (2012), http://www.jil.go.jp/
english/reports/documents/jilpt-reports/no.l1.pdf.
14. See Andr6 Sobczak, Legal Dimensions of International Framework Agreements
in the Field of Corporate Social Responsibility, 62 INDUS. REL. 466,484 (2007), https://hal-
audencia.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-007946
4 7/document (explaining that EU works
councils' agreements are much less common outside of Europe but using Argentina and
Brazil as examples of countries where EU firms have expanded and introduced works
councils).
15. See generally Eddie Webster & Ian Macun, A Trend Towards Co-
Determination? Case Studies of South African Enterprises, 2 L., DEMOCRACY & DEV. 63
(1998).
16. 1994 O.J. (L 254) 64, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/
HTML/?uri=CELEX:31994L0045&from=EN, as amended by Directive 2009/38/EC, of
the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009 on the establishment of a
European Works Council or a procedure in Community-scale undertakings and
Community-scale groups of undertakings for the purposes of informing and consulting
employees, art. 2(1)(a), 2009 O.J. (L 122) 33, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/
en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32009L0038.
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required each EU member country to develop legislation covering
employers with more than 50 employees and requiring an inform-and-
consult or inform-and-consent system for employee participation. 17 At a
minimum, council rights involve an exchange of information, whereby
management is required to inform workers of key workplace decisions and
plans.18 In many countries, works councils also have consultation rights,
which require management o not only inform the council of the managerial
intentions, but also to wait for a formulated response or counterproposal
that must be taken under consideration before a final decision can be made.1 9
Finally, in some countries such as Germany, councils operate within a system
of codetermination, where certain managerial actions may only be taken
with the consent of the council, which effectively provides the council with
veto rights.2 0
The works-councils phenomenon has generated significant attention
from global management researchers and labor-relations scholars in recent
years.21 Such attention appears well-merited for at least two compelling
reasons. First, traditional forms of employee representation, ranging from
the centralized bargaining and political exchange once common in Europe
to the decentralized collective bargaining systems of North America, may no
longer be adequate in providing for full worker representation in today's
17. 2002 O.J. (L 80) 29, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=
cellar:f2bc5eea-9cc4-4f56-889d-3cc4c5ee5927.0004.02/DOCl&format=PDF.
18. See Rogers & Streeck, supra note 10, at 8.
19. See id. For an in-depth discussion of how consultation rights operate in the EU
context of mass economic dismissals, see generally Anne Marie Lofaso, Talking Is
Worthwhile: The Role of Employee Voice in Protecting, Enhancing, and Encouraging
Individual Rights to Job Security in a Collective System, 14 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 55,
82-86 (2010) (describing and analyzing consultation rights under EU's collective
redundancies directive).
20. See Walther Muller-Jentsch, Germany: From Collective Voice to Co-
Management, in WORKS COUNCILS: CONSULTATION, REPRESENTATION, AND
COOPERATION IN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 59-60 (Joel Rogers & Wolfgang Streeck eds.,
1995) (noting those effective veto powers are, however, tied to managerial actions
related to social matters, personnel, planning, staff movements, etc.).
21. See, e.g., John T. Addison, Paulino Teixeria & Thomas Zwick, German Works
Councils and the Anatomy of Wages, 63 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 247 (2010); Martin
Behrens, Still Married After All These Years? Union Organizing and the Role of Works
Councils in German Industrial Relations, 62 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 275 (2009);
Annette van den Berg, Yolanda Grift & Arjen van Witteloostuijn, Managerial




modern business and economic environments.22 In the United States, for
example, unionization rates have fallen to approximately 10.7 percent of the
workforce, or just 14.8 million workers,23 while surveys suggest that more
than 100 million U.S. workers with no collective representation desire some
form of collective voice, reflecting a substantial "representation gap" that
compromises basic democratic ideals and increases interest in other types of
employee representation, such as works councils.
24
Second, works councils appear capable of increasing firm productivity
and bottom-line profitability.25 This effect may result in large part due to the
regular consultation and information exchange processes between workers
and management that are facilitated by works councils. Such open exchanges
of information tend to reduce information asymmetries and lower the cost
of information to both parties, leading to increased trust and cooperation
between management and employees.26 Empirical evidence lends support
for this position. For instance, it has been found that establishments with
works councils are, on average, 6.4 percent more productive than firms
without works councils, a figure that may in fact underestimate some of the
positive effects of works councils.27 Similarly, the effects of works councils
on firm profits are both positive and significant when using an objective
measure of firm profitability.28 Along the same lines, Hirsch, Schank, and
Schnabel, economic scholars and researchers, found that works councils lead
to lower separation rates, especially for low-tenure workers.29 In addition,
22. See, e.g., Steffen Mueller, Works Councils and Establishment Productivity, 65
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 880, 880-81 (2012) [hereinafter Mueller, Establishment
Productivity]; see Joel Rogers, United States: Lessons from Abroad and Home, in WORKS
COUNCILS: CONSULTATION, REPRESENTATION, AND COOPERATION IN INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS 376 (Joel Rogers & Wolfgang Streeck eds., 1995).
23. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, UNION MEMBERS
SUMMARY 2 (2018), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf (noting the 2017
union rate was half of what it was in 1983).
24. See, e.g., Mueller, Establishment Productivity, supra note 22; Rogers & Streeck,
supra note 10, at 4.
25. See, e.g., Steffen Mueller, Works Councils and Firm Profits Revisited, 49
BRITISH J. INDUS. REL. 27 (2011) [hereinafter Mueller, Firm Profits] (noting empirical
studies in Germany that indicate works councils increase productivity); see also Rogers
& Streeck, supra note 10, at 4; Mueller, Establishment Productivity, supra note 22.
26. See Rogers & Streeck, supra note 10, at 4.
27. See Mueller, Establishment Productivity, supra note 22, at 891.
28. See Mueller, Firm Profits, supra note 25, at 27.
29. See Boris Hirsch, Thorsten Schank & Claus Schnabel, Works Councils and
Separations: Voice, Monopoly, and Insurance Effects, 49 INDUS. REL. 566,585-86 (2010).
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van den Berg, Grift, and van Witteloostuijn, also economic scholars,
reported a positive association between works councils and organizational
performance, especially when coupled with a positive attitude of managers
toward the councils.30 Finally, beyond firm profitability and productivity,
works councils may also contribute to the overall good of society by
encouraging the enforcement of legal requirements in areas such as
environmental protection,31 gender equality,32 and health and safety.33
Despite wide application on a global scale due in large part to the
practical advantages described above, works councils are noticeably missing
from the employee-relations landscape in the United States. The New Deal
system of labor relations, founded upon the Wagner Act of 193534 and the
Taft-Hartley Act of 1947,31 was developed as a means for allowing workers
to select an exclusive collective-bargaining agent via secret ballot in a
process free of managerial interference.36 This system was based on a series
of premises including: (1) a stark contrast between production workers who
were thought to be singularly concerned with wages and working conditions
and managers who were assumed fully capable of operating their businesses
without employee input; (2) a closed economy with little or no global wage
competition; (3) assembly-line mass production of standardized goods by an
unskilled and semiskilled workforce; and (4) family wages and benefits
focused on the lifetime employment of a male breadwinner.37 As Rogers
noted:
Put simply, the world described by these premises no longer exists-
workers have other interests, management needs more worker
involvement, the economy is more open, production is more flexible and
30. See Annette van den Berg, Yolanda Grift & Arjen van Witteloostuijn, Works
Councils and Organizational Performance: The Role of Top Managers' and Work
Councils' Attitudes in Bad Vis-ci-Vis Good Times, 32 J. LAB. RES. 136, 150 (2011).
31. See Jan Erik Askildsen, Uwe Jirjahn & Stephen C. Smith, Works Councils and
Environmental Investment: Theory and Evidence from German Panel Data, 60 J. ECON.
BEHAV. & ORG. 346,350-55 (2006).
32. See John S. Heywood & Uwe Jirjahn, Family-Friendly Practices and Worker
Representation i  Germany, 48 INDUS. REL. 121,142 (2009).
33. See David Weil, Are Mandated Health and Safety Committees Substitutes for or
Supplements to Labor Unions?, 52 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 339,351-52 (1999).
34. National Labor Relations Act of 1935 §§ 1-19, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2012).
35. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (2012).
36. See id. See generally National Labor Relations Act of 1935.
37. See Rogers, supra note 22, at 376-77.
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quality driven, jobs are less stable, and the workforce is more diverse-
and the system based on them works poorly in the world that does.
38
The inability of U.S. companies to participate in the worldwide
phenomenon of works councils represents a potentially untapped key for
increasing U.S. global competitiveness. Despite a strong call for addressing
this issue over two decades ago,39 little or no substantive action has
subsequently been taken to increase employee participation in the context
of U.S. labor law.40 The purpose of this Article, therefore, is to provide a
detailed review of U.S. labor law in relation to works councils before
presenting three contrasting legal options for increasing worker
participation in the United States via works councils, thereby increasing U.S.
global competitiveness.
II. THE UNITED STATES' EXPERIENCES WITH WORKS COUNCILS IN THE
CONTEXT OF U.S. LABOR LAW
In the United States, the experience with works-council models has
been circumscribed and, to a significant degree, limited by the provisions of
the National Labor Relations Act.41 Passed in 1935 as the Wagner Act
42 and
later amended by the Taft-Hartley Act 43 in 1947, the law primarily has
provided federal protection to employees in the private sector who desire to
unionize or to otherwise engage in concerted, protected activity. The
cornerstone of the Act can be found in Section 7 which grants:
Employees... have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purposes of collective bargaining or other mutual aid
or protection, and... the right to refrain from any or all such activities
except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement
38. See id. at 376.
39. See, e.g., Rogers & Streeck, supra note 10, at 4.
40. See Mueller, Establishment Productivity, supra note 22, at 881.
41. See generally Orly Lobel & Anne Marie Lofaso, System of Employee
Representation at the Enterprise: The US Report, in 11 JAPAN INST. FOR LABOUR POL'Y
& TRAINING, SYSTEM OF EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION AT THE ENTERPRISE 153 (2012),
http://www.jil.go.jp/english/reports/documents/ilpt-reports/no.l 1.pdf.
42. See National Labor Relations Act of 1935 § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012) (popularly
known as the Wagner Act).
43. See Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (2012)
(popularly known as the Taft-Hartley Act).
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requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of
employment as authorized in section 158(a)(3) .... 44
The Act primarily established a protected pathway to unionization for
employees and created the concept of exclusivity, whereby an employer
could only deal with the union selected by the employees to represent hem
in all matters involving wages, hours, and conditions of employment. This
concept is found in Section 9(a) of the Act:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of
collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit
appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of
all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining
in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other
conditions of employment .... 45
Early on, the Supreme Court, in J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, developed the
concept of exclusivity in the context of a bargaining dispute involving a union
that won a secret-ballot election and was certified as the Section 9(a)
majority representative of a bargaining unit that included employees who
held individual contracts with the employer. 46 That employer refused to
bargain with the union, notwithstanding its majority status, on grounds that
collective bargaining may affect the terms and conditions of employment it
had already agreed to by individual contract with individual employees.47
The Court held that the employer's refusal to bargain in these circumstances
violated Section 8(a)(5),48 notwithstanding the existence of the individual
contracts.
49
In a unionized setting, an employer cannot normally deal unilaterally
with individual employees on mandatory subjects of bargaining.50 Nor may
44. See National Labor Relations Act of 1935 § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157.
45. See id. § 9, 29 U.S.C. § 159.
46. See J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 339 (1944) (holding that an employer
violates Section 8(a)(5) when it refuses to bargain over terms and conditions of
employment that may affect individual contracts the employer has with some of its
employees).
47. Id. at 334.
48. National Labor Relations Act of 1935 § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (requiring
employers to bargain with duly elected representatives of an employee unit).
49. J. I. Case Co., 321 U.S. at 339.
50. See id. A significant corollary to this rule, which stems from J. I. Case Co., is
that unions may contractually waive exclusivity and permit direct dealing where the
collective-bargaining agreement serves as a floor of rights. The most prominent example
2018] 523
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an employer deal with other employee organizations on such topics.51 Thus,
an employee committee that might be formed to deal with management on
wages, hours, or other terms and conditions of employment is legally viewed
as interfering with the "exclusive right" of the certified union to cover these
areas.5 2 Any effort by an employer to establish such employee committees
or otherwise deal with them on such topics may result in a certified union
bringing a Section 8(a)(5) charge,53 alleging refusal to bargain with the
"exclusive" representative.54
However, even where there is no union on the scene, the Act still
constrains free-and-easy dealings with employee committees or councils that
touch upon working condition issues.55 Through the law's definition of a
"labor organization," and its prohibition of employer interference or
domination of such labor organizations, employers have had to tread
cautiously in trying to establish or deal with employee committees that might
enhance efficiency and harmony in the workplace.5
6 The core concept of
exclusivity in unionized settings, coupled with early fears of employers
establishing "company unions" to avoid real collective bargaining, have all
had the effect of placing roadblocks in front of any drive toward works
councils in the United States.
57
The Act does not ban all interactions between management and
employee committees or councils, but severe limitations on such interactions
of this arrangement is found in professional sports contracts. For example, the 2017-2021
Basic Agreement between Major League Baseball and the MLB Players Association
provides: "A Player, if he so desires, may designate an agent to conduct on his behalf, or
to assist him in, the negotiation of an individual salary and/or Special Covenants to be
included in his Uniform Player's Contract with any Club, provided such agent has been
certified to the Clubs by the Association as authorized to act as a Player Agent for such
purposes." See Negotiation and Approval of Contracts, 2017-2021 BASIC AGREEMENT 2,
http://www.mlbplayers.com/pdf9/5450407.pdf (last visited July 4, 2018).
51. National Labor Relations Act of 1935 § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a).
52. See id.
53. See id. § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5).
54. See id.; see also id. § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a).
55. See id. § 2(5), 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (casting a broad definition of "labor
organization" and thus establishing a broad zone of protection for workers and broad
barriers for engagement by management).
56. See id.
57. William N. Cooke, Evolution of the National Labor Relations Act, in UNION
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exist because of the interplay of two central provisions of the Act, one
defining a "labor organization" and the other forbidding employer
domination of such organizations.58 The first provision in Section 2(5)
defines a labor organization as "any organization of any kind, or any agency
or employee representation committee or plan, in which employees
participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing
with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay,
hours of employment or conditions of work. '59 The second is Section 8(a)(2)
which makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to dominate or
interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization or
contribute financial or other support to it. ... ",60 This provision was
undoubtedly designed to nullify any employer efforts to "control"
unionization by establishing and supporting their own company-created
unions,61 a concern that was very much on the minds of the bill's original
supporters, including Senator Wagner.62
The threshold question in litigation settings is often whether a
"committee or plan" is a labor organization, because if a "committee or
plan" is not found to be a labor organization, then no Section 8(a)(2)
violation is possible and an employer would be free to deal with the
committee.63 The problem is that Section 2(5)'s definition of labor
organization is so broad that many committees or councils, regardless of
internal form or structure, meet the statutory threshold requirements.64
Moreover, under Section 2(5), the range of subjects a labor organization
might deal with is sweeping.65 However, central to the analysis is the question
of what it means for such a committee to be "dealing with" management.66
Does dealing with imply only a collective-bargaining-type relationship as one
might think of when considering standard labor unions or could it mean
something more expansive?
The Supreme Court ultimately resolved this issue in NLRB v. Cabot
Carbon Co., a case involving an employee committee system where the




62. 79 CONG. REC. 2371-72 (1935) (statement of Sen. Wagner).
63. See National Labor Relations Act of 1935 § 8(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2).
64. See id.
65. See id.; see also id. § 2(5), 29 U.S.C. § 152(5).
66. See id. § 2(5), 29 U.S.C. § 152(5).
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elected employee representatives met regularly with management to discuss
matters of mutual interest, including seniority, time off, job classifications,
and other conditions of employment.67 The Court found that the employee
committees were indeed labor organizations dealing with management.
6
The Court found that discussions between the committee and management
on topics such as seniority, job classifications, and the like, constituted
dealing with.69 In essence, the Court held that the Section 2(5) phrase dealing
with was not to be equated with formal collective bargaining, but constituted
a lower standard of relationship.70 After tracing Section 2(5)'s legislative
history, the Court concluded, "Congress, by adopting the broad term
'dealing' and rejecting the more limited term 'bargaining collectively,' did
not intend that the broad term 'dealing with' should be limited to and mean
only 'bargaining with' .... ,,71
Moreover, the fact that the committees only made recommendations
to management-and that management at all times held the final authority
as to whether to accept or reject such recommendations-was irrelevant in
determining labor-organization status.72 Indeed, in subsequent cases, the fact
that employee committees or participation plans only communicated their
"views" and did not make formal recommendations was also not dispositive
in determining Section 2(5) status.73
A. Safe Committees Under the Act
As noted above, while the Act is an impediment to full works-council
concepts, it is not absolute in that regard. Some employee committees are
safe from scrutiny-an employer's interaction with such committees will be
deemed permissible-and not every employee committee that interacts with
management will be deemed a Section 2(5) labor organization.74 For
example, an employee committee that is limited to topics such as operational
or labor efficiency problems and does not deal with bargainable matters
(e.g., wages, hours, working conditions) will not be deemed a labor
67. See NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203, 205-06 (1959).
68. See id. at 209.
69. Id. at 217-18.
70. See id. at 218-19.
71. See id. at 210-11.
72. Id. at 214.
73. See id.
74. See E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 893, 895 (1993).
[Vol. 66526
U.S. Labor Law as a Restriction to Works Councils
organization.75 Further, even if the committee's agenda covers negotiable
matters, if an employer completely delegates managerial authority to that
employee committee, it will not commit a Section 8(a)(2) violation because
it will not be dealing with the committee.76
This viewpoint found its first expression in General Foods Corp.77
There, the employer specifically delegated certain job assignments and
scheduling responsibilities to four employee work teams.78 These work
teams (called "job enrichment program" teams) investigated plant safety
and reevaluated job procedures.79 While these teams were clearly dealing
with Section 2(5) subjects and clearly had interaction with management, the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) found that the teams were not
labor organizations because the activities of the teams involved managerial
functions that were entirely delegated to employees and consequently did
not involve dealing with the employer within the meaning of Section 2(5).80
Similarly, in a more recent decision, the NLRB ruling in the Crown Cork &
Seal Co. case dictated that work production teams charged with deciding and
acting upon production issues, work quality, training, attendance, safety,
maintenance, and discipline short of suspension were not labor
organizations.81 The decision underscored the fact that because the authority
exercised by the committee was "unquestionably managerial," it was
comparable to that exercised by a frontline manager or supervisor.82 Because
the teams performed the functions that a manager would perform with
limited oversight, they could not be found to be labor organizations dealing
with management; thus, no violation was found.83
One federal court went even further in seemingly sanctioning an
employee committee that neither dealt with strictly managerial functions nor
had been delegated final responsibility for any operational matters.84 In the
case of NLRB v. Streamway Division of Scott & Fetzer Co., a three-judge
75. See Gen. Foods Corp., 231 N.L.R.B. 1232, 1235 (1977).
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. Id. at 1233.
79. Id. at 1234.
80. See id.
81. See Crown Cork & Seal Co., 334 N.L.R.B. 699, 701 (2001).
82. Id.
83. Id.




panel of the federal Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to enforce a
finding that the employer had unlawfully assisted an employee committee
that had been set up to improve communications on various workplace
issues.85 The Court observed, "[N]ot all management efforts to communicate
with employees concerning company policy are forbidden on pain of
violating the Act. An overly broad construction of the statute would be as
destructive of the objects as the Act as ignoring the provisions entirely."
86
The Court then cited with favor to Judge Wisdom's dissent in NLRB v.
Walton Manufacturing Co.:
To my mind, an inflexible attitude of hostility toward employee
committees defeats the Act. It erects an iron curtain between employer
and employees, penetrable only by the bargaining agent of a certified
union, if there is one, preventing the development of a decent, honest,
constructive relationship between management and labor.
87
Although the Sixth Circuit's opinion appears to be a minority view, it
is noted here as an important perspective on employee-employer joint
efforts to improve the "general welfare" of employees.
88
Another committee that will not be found to be a Section 2(5) labor
organization dealing with management is one that serves an adjudicatory
function. A committee that simply adjudicates (e.g., a grievance committee
with full authority to act on a given case) has been found not to be a Section
2(5) labor organization.89 For example, the ruling in Sparks Nugget, Inc. did
not find labor organization status when a joint employer-employee
grievance committee performed a "purely adjudicatory" function and thus
was not dealing with management.90 The committee only convened to hear
grievances filed by individual employees and made final decisions on such
grievances.91
Years later, a similar ruling in Syracuse University upheld the finding
that Syracuse University's Staff Complaint Process (SCP) was not a labor
85. Id.
86. Id. at 292.
87. Id. (quoting NLRB v. Walton Mfg. Co., 289 F.2d 177, 182 (5th Cir. 1961)
(Wisdom, J., dissenting)).
88. See id.
89. National Labor Relations Act of 1935 § 2(5), 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (2012).
90. Sparks Nugget, Inc., 230 N.L.R.B. 275,276 (1977).
91. Id.
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organization within the meaning of Section 2(5).92 The SCP was a complaint-
resolution procedure designed to resolve employee relations issues between
nonbargaining unit employees and their supervisors.93 The university
introduced the new procedure in 2003, and it began to train volunteer
employee participants on the techniques of mediation and problem solving.94
The SCP operated during working hours using facilities and supplies
provided by the university.95 The human-resources department played an
active role in the SCP, with the staff-complaint coordinator being an HR
employee.96 HR trained the volunteers and served as a resource for
questions about the SCP, while managers and supervisors were eligible to
serve as staff advocates, mediators, and panel members.97 The decision in
this case concluded that the SCP was not a labor organization because its
purpose was not to deal with the employer on terms and conditions of
employment.98 Rather, its purpose was limited to an adjudicatory function.99
B. Electromation and Its Progeny
While there had previously been, as noted, considerable case law
regarding the definition of a labor organization under Section 2(5) and
Section 8(a)(2), the NLRB issued one of its pivotal decisions in this area in
1992, reexamining the entire field and providing future guidance as to the
meaning of both sections.100 In Electromation, Inc., the Board held that
certain employee "action committees" were labor organizations under
Section 2(5) of the National Labor Relations Act because they sought
resolution of matters of employee concern, including time-off rules and
compensation issues.1 01 In this case, the employer, concerned about a variety
of employee complaints, decided that "the best course of action would be to
involve the employees in coming up with solutions to these issues.'10 2
Accordingly, the company set up five ad hoc employee committees to deal
92. See Syracuse Univ., 350 N.L.R.B. 755, 755 (2007).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 763.
95. Id. at 755.
96. Id. at 756.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 758.
99. Id.
1,00. Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990, 990 (1992).
101. See id. at 997.
102. See id. at 1016.
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with five particular workplace issues.10 3 The committees would meet to
discuss the problems and come up with recommendations for management.
Management designated the areas that each of the five committees would
work on: absenteeism/infractions, no smoking policy, communications
network, pay progression for premium positions, and attendance bonus
program.04 Management decided that each committee would be comprised
of up to six hourly employees, one or two management representatives, and
the personnel manager.105 Ultimate selection of committee members would
be done by management, following a request for volunteers.
0 6 Managers
also served on the committees.
10 7
The committees met once a week in the company conference room.
108
Employees were paid for their time, and they were provided with supplies,
calculators, and other support to do their work.109 The committees began
their work, but not long passed before the company received notice that a
union was demanding recognition.110 With that information, management
withdrew the managers from the committees but told the committees they
themselves could continue to meet."' There was no evidence that the
committees had been formed to blunt the union drive in any way or that
management even knew about it at the time the committees were formed.1
2
Nevertheless, the administrative law judge found that the committees were
unlawfully dominated labor organizations within the meaning of Sections
2(5) and 8(a)(2)."3
With the case on appeal to the full Board, the Board held oral
arguments due to the importance of the issues, and many amici curiae also
weighed in on both sides of the question.4 The Board itself cast the issues
to be decided with these two questions: "(1) At what point does an employee
103. Id. at 1017.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 991.






112. Id. at 1018.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 990 n.2 (listing amicus briefs submitted from a mix of lawmakers and labor
organizations).
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committee lose its protection as a communication device and become a labor
organization? [and] (2) What conduct of an employer constitutes
domination or interference with the employee committee?'1 15
In its final decision, the Board began with a review of the history of
Section 2(5), specifically quoting Senator Wagner himself when speaking
about his bill and the evils of company unions.11 6 The Senator said:
Genuine collective bargaining is the only way to attain equality of
bargaining power.... The greatest obstacles to collective bargaining are
employer-dominated unions, which have multiplied with amazing
rapidity since the enactment of [the National Industrial Recovery Act].
Such a union makes a sham of equal bargaining power.... [O]nly
representatives who are not subservient to the employer with whom
they deal can act freely in the interest of employees. For these reasons,
the very first step toward genuine collective bargaining is the abolition
of the employer dominated union as an agency for dealing with
grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates, or hours of employment.11 7
The Board then reviewed the legislative history, which supported the
contention that the Congress was defining labor organizations broadly and
was particularly concerned about employer involvement in the formation of
such organizations.118 It noted that, in the end, any employee group, whether
representative or not, "may meet the statutory definition of 'labor
organization' even if it lacks a formal structure, has no elected officers,
constitution or bylaws, does not meet regularly and does not require
payment of initiation fees or dues."'119
In considering the "interplay" between Section 2(5) and Section
8(a)(2),120 the Board turned to NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co.121 The Board
noted that the Supreme Court had reviewed the legislative history of the
1947 Taft-Hartley Act and underscored the rejection by House and Senate
115. Id. at 990.
116. Id. at 992-93.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 993.
119. Id. at 994 (citations omitted).
120. See National Labor Relations Act of 1935 §§ 2(5)-(8)(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. §§
152(5)-(8)(a)(2) (2012).
121. Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. at 995 (citing NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co.,
360 U.S. 203 (1959)).
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conferees of a proposed new Section 8(d)(3).122 Passed by the House, that
section would have "expressly permitted 'forming or maintaining by an
employer of a committee of employees and discussing with it matters of
mutual interest, including grievances, wages, hours of employment, and
other working conditions' in the absence of a certified or recognized"
union.123 This bill was rejected, thus reemphasizing the limitations that the
original Act was placing on employers in terms of dealing with employee
committees.124 In addition, as noted earlier, the Court in that case broadly
defined the term dealing with.
25
The Board, however, underscored what had already begun to emerge
in the case law, namely that despite the broad reach of Section 2(5), many
employee committees will not be deemed labor organizations.
126 As to the
issue of "domination" under Section 8(a)(2), the Board noted that there is
no question that a labor organization that is "the creation of management,
whose structure and function are essentially determined by
management... and whose continued existence depends on the fiat of
management, is one whose formation or administration has been dominated
under Section 8(a)(2)."'127 On the other hand, "when the formulation and
structure of the organization is determined by the employees," then there
can be no domination.128 The Board also explained that the employer's
motive is irrelevant in these cases, as is the perception of the employees
themselves as to whether the committee is a labor organization.
129 Applying
these principles here, the Board had no trouble finding that the action
committees were labor organizations and thereby concluded that the
activities of the committees constituted dealing with the employer, the
subject matter involved "conditions of employment," and the committees
acted in a representational capacity.
130
The Board also found domination existed, based on the fact that it was
122. Id.




126. See id. at 995-96.
127. Id. at 995.
128. Id. at 995-96 (citing Duquesne Univ. of the Holy Ghost, 198 N.L.R.B. 891, 892-
93 (1972)).
129. Id. (citations omitted).
130. Id. at 997.
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the employer's idea to form these committees and findings that the
employer wrote the purposes and goals of the committees, determined how
many members would be on the committees, and appointed management
representatives to the committees to facilitate discussion."' Finally, there
was paid time for committee activities and other employer support.1 32
Although such support by itself would not have been a Section 8(a)(2)
violation, it was cited as an adjunct to the rest of the unlawful domination.1 33
Interestingly, while all four members of the Board found unlawful
domination existed under the particular facts of the case, three members in
their concurring opinions emphasized the benefit of certain employee
committees and sought to reassure the management world that the decision
would not sound the death knell of all such committees.134 For example,
Dennis Devaney, an NLRB member, in his concurring opinion tried to
minimize the impact of the Board's ruling, expressing his belief that many
employee committees could exist and work with management while not
running afoul of the Act.135 He felt that these types of committees focusing
on "safety, quality control, and productivity" and other managerial issues
were perfectly permissible because of the Section 2(5) definition of a labor
organization, which indicates the organization must deal with management
on "grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or
conditions of work. ' 136 Member Devaney's basic view, contrary to his
colleagues, was that he "would not be inclined to find that an employee
group constituted a statutory labor organization unless the group acted as a
representative of other employees.1' 37
Member Clifford Oviatt also concurred in the result but added his own
view of the situation.1 38 He noted that employee participation groups (e.g.,
so-called "quality circles"), which may be established by management,
whose purpose is to use employee expertise by having the group examine
certain operational problems, such as labor efficiency and material waste,
should not be viewed as implicating matters identified in Section 2(5).139 He
131. Id. at 990.
132. Id. at 998.
133. See id.
134. Id. at 998-99.
135. Id. at 999 (Devaney, Bd. Member, concurring).
136. Id. at 993; id. at 999 n.1.
137. Id. at 1002 (emphasis added).
138. Id. at 1003-05 (Oviatt, Bd. Member, concurring).
139. Id. at 1004.
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noted that this is also true of "quality-of-work-life programs" that involved
a company's attempt to draw on the creativity of employees by including
them in decisions that affect their work lives and other such programs that
stress joint problem-solving structures to engage management and
employees in finding ways of improving operational functions.
140 He added:
Where there is a labor union on the scene, these employee-
management cooperative programs may act as a complement to the
union. They can not, however, lawfully usurp the traditional role of the
Union in representing the employees in collective bargaining about
grievances, wages, hours, and terms and conditions of work. Where no
labor union represents the employees, these programs are often
established to open lines of communication so that the operation may
take advantage of employee technical knowledge and
expertise.... Certainly, I find nothing in today's decision that should be
read as a condemnation of cooperative programs and committees of the
type I have outlined above. The statute does not forbid direct
communication between the employer and its employees to address and
solve significant productivity and efficiency problems in the workplace.
In my view, committees and groups dealing with these subjects alone
plainly fall outside the Section 2(5) definition of "labor
organization" .... 141
However, Member John Raudabaugh, in his concurrence, did not feel
as confident as his colleagues regarding the viability of most employee plans
or committees under the case law.142 In fact, he seemed to feel just the
opposite-that most such committees would be viewed as Section 2(5) labor
organizations-and noted that "[e]ven if the committee's stated purpose is
to deal only with such entrepreneurial concerns as product quality or
workplace efficiency, it seems clear that the committee, in order to achieve
its purpose, would have to consider one or more of the subjects listed in
Section 2(5)."143 While his perspective was that most employee committees
would be found to be labor organizations, whether there was unlawful
domination of such organizations was, however, another matter.
1" Taking
into account the benefit of the many cooperative employee-employer
committees that help productivity and efficiency in the workplace, Member
Raudabaugh proposed a four-step test to determine Section 8(a)(2)
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1004-05.
142. Id. at 1005-15 (Raudabaugh, Bd. Member, concurring).
143. Id. at 1008.
144. Id. at 1013-14.
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violations:
In my view, the answer to the question turns on the following factors:
(1) the extent of the employer's involvement in the structure and
operation of the committees; (2) whether the employees, from an
objective standpoint, reasonably perceive the EPP [(employee
participation plan)] as a substitute for full collective bargaining through
a traditional union; (3) whether employees have been assured of their
Section 7 right to choose to be represented by a traditional union under
a system of full collective bargaining; and (4) the employer's motive in
establishing the EPP. I would consider all four factors in any given case.
No single factor would necessarily be dispositive.145
While never adopted in subsequent case law, Member Raudabaugh's
four-point test may constitute a different method of analysis for future cases,
serve as the basis for new legislation, or both.146
Shortly after Electromation, in E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., the
Board similarly found that certain employee safety committees were also
labor organizations and, in at least one case, employer dominated.147 In this
case, six safety committees and one fitness committee were deemed labor
organizations and employer dominated.148 Management had established the
committees and controlled their administration by determining the
composition of the committee and having a management member conduct
and lead the meetings.149 While management members can be on the
committee, the Board said they must be in the minority and cannot exercise
veto power over decisions.150 In this case, a union was already the certified
representative of the employees as well. 51 The Board reviewed the case law
again and reemphasized at the outset some general principles.152 First, the
concept of dealing with as used in Section 2(5) does not have to involve
formal bargaining, but instead is satisfied when there is a "bilateral
mechanism" between the parties, defined as a situation in which a group of
145. Id. at 1013.
146. See id.
147. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 893, 893 (1993).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 896 (noting the management member of the committee had the power to
veto any decision reached by the committees).
150. Id. at 895.
151. See id. at 893.
152. Id. at 894.
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employees makes proposals to management over time and management
responds to these proposals by acceptance or rejection.
1 53
The Board also summarized the types of activities that would not run
afoul of the Act as follows:
" a committee formed simply to engage in fact-finding on a specific
topic would not be deemed a labor organization under Section
2(5);
" a committee formed to merely brainstorm ideas in the manner of a
suggestion box would not be a labor organization; and
* a committee that, even though dealing with bargainable topics, has
been specifically delegated the task of deciding what to do by
management would not be dealing with management under
Section 2(5).154
For example, there would be no dealing with management if the
committee was governed by majority decision-making, management
representatives were in the minority, and the committee had the power to
decide matters for itself, rather than simply making proposals to
management.
155
In the instant case, however, the Board found that the committees were
indeed labor organizations dealing with the employer on Section 2(5)
subjects.5 6 On the question of domination, the Board also found that the
employer dominated the committee in violation of Section 8(a)(2), in part
because the employer retained veto power over any action of the committee,
controlled the number of employees on the committee, and retained the
right to eliminate the committees at will.
1 57
Since Electromation and du Pont, the Board has attempted to
accommodate management needs to some degree against the dictates of
Section 8(a)(2). For example, in two cases, the Board ruled that committees
that served basically as "suggestion box" programs were not labor
organizations.158 Suggestion boxes and brainstorming groups do not violate
153. See id.
154. See id.
155. Id. at 895.
156. Id. at 895-96.
157. Id.
158. EFCO Corp., 327 N.L.R.B. 372, 372 (1998).
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the Act where the purpose is merely to develop ideas that management may
or may not adopt.159
Likewise, in Georgia Power Co., enforced in 2005,160 the Board found
that the employer's creation of a Workplace Ethics Program did not violate
the Act. 161 The committee did not exist to deal with the employer, but rather
made management-level decisions regarding ethics complaints filed by
employees.162 In doing so, the Board majority reversed the administrative
law judge who had found that the Workplace Ethics Program was not "a
purely managerial decision making vehicle," but was instead a grievance
committee "designed to provide employees with a different procedure for
resolving" managerial decisions without resorting to the union. 63 However,
although the Board did not find an 8(a)(2) violation, it did find that the
employer violated Section 8(a)(5) when it went further and implemented
ideas brought forth by the program's committee without negotiating over
those changes with the union.164 In addition, another committee formed to
provide input on choosing a crew chief leader was also not deemed a labor
organization because the employer was only looking for input from the
employees and had also made clear that the process of selecting crew chiefs
would not change without negotiations with the union.165 There had been
complaints about the process of selection; management sought employee
input regarding the process but had also assured the union that no changes
would be made without negotiations.166 The committee met twice and made
recommendations to management.167
The Board underscored the principle that "an employer may lawfully.
159. See, e.g., id.; Polaroid Corp., 329 N.L.R.B. 424 (1999) (noting other types of
committees proposed by the employer did indeed run afoul of the NLRB prohibitions
against "dominating" labor organizations). See generally THE DEVELOPING LABOR
LAW: THE BOARD, THE COURTS, AND THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT (John E.
Higgins, Jr. ed., 6th ed. 2012).
160. See Ga. Power Co. v. NLRB, 427 F.3d 1354, 1361 (11th Cir. 2005) (enforcing
Ga. Power Co., 342 N.L.R.B. 192 (2004)).
161. See Ga. Power Co., 342 N.L.R.B. 192, 194 (2004) (holding further that bypassing
the already recognized union by implementing the Workplace Ethics Program
constituted direct dealing in violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA).
162. Ga. Power Co., 427 F.3d at 1356.
163. See Ga. Power Co., 342 N.L.R.B. at 200-01.
164. Id. at 192.
165. Ga. Power Co., 427 F.3d at 1360.




consult with its own employees in formulating proposals for bargaining,"
citing Permanente Medical Group.168 In applying that principle to the instant
case, the Board noted that the employer had gone out of its way to indicate
that no changes would take place without negotiations with the union and
that the committee was only providing ideas to help management make
proposals to the union.1 69 The Board cross-referenced E. I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co., noting that an employer may lawfully form an employee
"brainstorming" group to develop a host of ideas from which the employer
may use to develop formal proposals.
17°
In Bradford Printing & Finishing, the Board found that a "Guiding
Coalition" was a labor organization dominated by the employer. 171 The
Guiding Coalition was created by the company chief executive who told
employees that it would address "such issues as work hours, holidays,
attendance, discipline, and grievances.172 That executive also said that a
union was "not necessary" because the Guiding Coalition would "be a
perfect forum to get involvement from all ranks and the Guiding Coalition
will be able to address all issues and concerns in a timely and fair manner.
173
The Guiding Coalition had an equal number of managers and employees
and was presided over by the president, who also set the agenda.
174
In Dow Chemical Co., various HR teams consisting of union
employees and supervisors were not deemed to be labor organizations.
175
Rather they were deemed managerial teams "engaged in activity which
management had previously done," such as "posting jobs, interviewing
applicants for jobs, and making a recommendation as to who would be hired,
working on vacation and coverage questions all of which management had
heretofore done, holiday work schedules ... scheduling work and training
which had heretofore been strictly a management prerogative.'' 76 The teams
168. See id. at 193 (citing Permanente Med. Grp., Inc., 332 N.L.R.B. 1143, 1144
(2000)).
169. Id.
170. Id. at 193 n.7 (citing E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 893, 894
(1993)).
171. Bradford Printing & Finishing, 356 N.L.R.B. 899, 905 (2011).
172. Id. at 899 n.2.
173. Id. at 903.
174. Id. at 905.
175. Dow Chem. Co., 349 N.L.R.B. 104, 110 (2007).
176. Id.
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were set up partly to reduce the number of supervisory personnel.1 77 There
was also a clear understanding that the HR teams could not get into matters
reserved for the union and collective bargaining.178
In summary, the overwhelming interpretation of the law that the Board
has applied has been restrictive in regard to the use of committees as used in
the spirit of global practices of codetermination. There have been a few types
of exceptions, but they have been just that-exceptions-to their general
rulings in this area.
C. Higher Education and Academic Collective Bargaining as the Exception
to This Experience
Before turning to possible legislative solutions in this area, it may be
instructive to review an exception to the general lack of coexistence of
works-council practices and unions in U.S. industries: the field of higher
education.79 Colleges and universities have enjoyed a longstanding use of a
works-council type of arrangement whereby faculty play an important role '
in the management of the organization and its "product.'' 80 For more than a
century, "U.S. colleges and universities have used a governance model that
provides an extensive (and on some matters, an exclusive) decision making
role for faculty."181 Within this model, faculty members serve as "key
advisors on a broad" range of "institutional policies and practices.'182 For
instance, faculty input is sought "for executive level appointments," such as
"department chairs, deans, and academic executive administrators.'"83 "The
central 'product' of an institution of higher education is its academic
programs and degrees," and few four-year institutions would consider
offering a degree program without the proper review and approval by an
"appropriate faculty governance mechanism.'1 4 Consequently, via this
177. See id. at 108.
178. See id. at 110.
179. See Neil Bucklew, Christopher N. Ellison & Jeffery D. Houghton, Shared
Governance and Academic Collective Bargaining in American Higher Education: A
Potential Model for U.S. Participation in the Global Experience of Works Councils and
Codetermination, 4 J. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ACAD. 1, 1 (2012),
http://thekeep.eiu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1044&context=jcba.
180. Id. at 2, 7.






system of "shared governance," most institutions of higher education in the
United States have adopted a variant of the works-council system.
185
"Faculty Senate" has been the most common term for this
representative, elected council through which the faculty shares in the
governance of the institution.18 6 "[S]enior management of the institution
consults regularly with the Senate," whose "advice and counsel" is
considered "highly influential," if not actually determinative.
187 In recent
decades, faculty unionization has become broadly established in U.S. higher
education, yet many of these unionized campuses have maintained a shared-
governance mechanism (i.e., faculty senate) while implementing a collective-
bargaining relationship with the university. 88 In short, a works-council type
of arrangement coexists with collective bargaining, and there have been no
legal cases raised under the NLRB or any applicable state labor law
challenging the continuation of shared governance via faculty senates in the
face of growing unionization.
III. OPTIONS FOR CONSIDERATION
Few would argue that it is unimportant for the United States to
encourage employee participation practices along the lines of works councils
that hold promise for global competitiveness. However, moving further in
this direction will require close scrutiny and possible changes in the labor-
law prohibition that has become a critical barrier. In this Part, this Article
identifies three possible options for approaching this issue.
A. Option One
This approach relies on the NLRB to continue to manage policy
development regarding changing management practices and the
interpretations of the National Labor Relations Act.18
9 The assumption
supporting this option is that the Board is well suited to oversee the
development and potential expansion of works-council practices in the U.S.
business structure as they relate to the traditions of labor-management




188. See id at 7-8.
189. Id. at 1.
190. See id.
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maintaining the status quo, it is important to note that works councils are
only one example of the changing world of workplace practices, and the
agency charged with administering the National Labor Relations Act is quite
capable of managing the interaction of traditional labor-management
traditions relative to changing practices as needed.191
One danger with the status-quo approach is that it relies on a Board
that has in recent years shown itself to be highly political in its approach to
labor relations.9 With Board members appointed by the President and
confirmed by the Senate, the party in power has had great influence in the
direction the Board takes.193 For example, Board appointees during the
Reagan and Bush presidencies took decidedly pro-management positions on
questions of close interpretation.'94 In contrast, the Clinton and Obama
Boards took more pro-union stances.195 Thus, the Board is an uncertain
191. See id.
192. Joan Flynn, A Quiet Revolution at the Labor Board: The Transformation of the
NLRB, 1935-2000, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1361, 1368-1452 (2000) (tracing the increased
prevalence of partisan Board members starting with President Eisenhower's
appointment of management lawyer Guy Farmer in 1953 through 2000); Amy Semet,
Political Decision-Making at the National Labor Relations Board: An Empirical
Examination of the Board's Unfair Labor Practice Decisions through the Clinton & Bush
H Years, 37 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 223, 283 (2016).
193. See Semet, supra note 192, at 284 (noting that which political party holds power
has little bearing on NLRB decisions but that majority party power is most effective
when used during the nomination and confirmation process).
194. Id. at 231-32. See generally Anne Marie Lofaso, The Persistence of Union
Repression in an Era of Recognition, 62 ME. L. REV. 199 (2010). The Trump Board is
poised to continue this pattern. See, e.g., Hy-Brand Indus. Contractors (Hy-Brand I),
365 N.L.R.B. 156 (2017) (overruling Browning-Ferris Indus. of Cal., Inc., 362 N.L.R.B.
186 (2015) and reverting to "prior legal standard for determining whether two employers
are joint employers under the National Labor Relations Act"). The Trump Board
recently vacated Hy-Brand I-not on substantive grounds but on ethical grounds. See
Hy-Brand Indus. Contractors (Hy-Brand II), 366 N.L.R.B. 26 (2018) (vacating Hy-
Brand I on grounds that Board Member William Emanuel should have recused himself
from participating in that decision because of his firm's role in representing one of the
putative joint-employers in Browning-Ferris).
195. Compare Semet, supra note 192, at 225 (citing STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON
OVERSIGHT & GOV'T REFORM, 112TH CONG., PRESIDENT OBAMA'S PRO-UNION
BOARD: THE NLRB's METAMORPHOSIS FROM INDEPENDENT REGULATOR TO
DYSFUNCTIONAL UNION ADVOCATE 4 (Comm. Print 2012), http://oversight.house.gov/
wp-content/uploads/2012/12/NLRB-Report-FINAL-12.13.12.pdf (detailing a range of
criticisms of the Obama Administration and its NLRB, including decisions that were
seen to be "reinterpretation of decades-old labor law")), with H.R. 3459, "Protecting
Local Business Opportunity Act": Hearing on H.R. 3459 Before the Subcomm. on Health,
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vehicle for the future. When Democrats are in power, the NLRB is likely to
oppose the establishment of committees that touch upon conditions of
employment, wary that management will use such committees to undercut
their certified unions or to prevent future unionization.
196
B. Option Two
This approach would make some minimal changes to the law itself
before once again relying on the NLRB to apply the changed law. The
change that would be made to the National Labor Relations Act would be
an acknowledgement of the global impact of works-council practices and
would become a requirement for attention by the NLRB. One method for
making such a change in the law might be an amendment o Section 8(a)(2)
197
of the statute to read:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer.., to dominate
or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor
organization or contribute financial or other support to it: Provided,
That [it shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice
under this paragraph for an employer to establish, assist, maintain, or
participate in any organization or entity in which employees participate,
to discuss matters of mutual interest which focus on issues of quality,
productivity and efficiency. These entities cannot have, claim, or seek
authority to negotiate or enter into collective bargaining agreements with
the employees or to amend existing collective bargaining agreements
between the employer and any labor organization.]
198
The key assumption under this option is that the addition of such a
clear statement regarding the right of an employer to invoke and use works
councils would require the NLRB to recognize that right when administering
the National Labor Relations Act. The Board would need to permit such
Emp't, Labor & Pensions of the H. Comm. on Educ. & the Work force, 114th Cong. 56-
64 (2015) (statement of Anne Marie Lofaso, Professor, West Virginia University College
of Law) (explaining, for example, that the Obama Board's Browning-Ferris decision on
joint-employer status was merely reverting to the long-standing common law definition,
which itself had been precedent for a century but which the Reagan Board had
overturned, and thus taking issue with the characterization of this definition as a "radical
departure of long-standing law").
196. See Semet, supra note 192, at 226-27 (noting Democratic appointments are
likely to result in decisions more favorable to unions).
197. See National Labor Relations Act of 1935 § 8(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2)
(2012).
198. Id. The italicized text is the Authors' proposed addition to the existing statutory
language.
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developments as long as they do not undermine or threaten the role of the
exclusive bargaining agents as provided for in the law. This change would
allow employers to use works councils, but would make sure these entities
could not become employer-dominated unions.
C. Option Three
This approach would involve a more concerted modification of the
NLRA in the matter of developing works-council practices. It would not
only confirm the right of employers to adopt such practices, but would
provide guidance on how these practices would function in cases where no
bargaining agent exists and in cases where there is a bargaining agent in
place. Language would be added to the appropriate sections of the National
Labor Relations Act declaring that it is now public policy to support the
development of works-council practices in the workplace as well as to
preserve the longstanding right of employees to select bargaining
representatives of their own choosing. In addition, this declaration would
note the desirability of these practices as a way of encouraging company
effectiveness and international competitiveness.
In a way, this approach would parallel and update the underlying
policies of the Act much in the same way the original drafters of the Act
wanted to state their primary purposes.199 Indeed, while rarely cited, the
current Act begins with a long policy statement on the benefits of collective
bargaining and the impact of labor strife on the U.S. economy.200 This
opening statement maintains:
The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not
possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract and
employers who are organized in the corporate or other forms of
ownership association substantially burdens and affects the flow of
commerce, and tends to aggravate recurrent business depressions, by
depressing wage rates and the purchasing power of wage earners in
industry and by preventing the stabilization of competitive wage rates
and working conditions within and between industries.
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to
eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow
of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when
199. See, e.g., S. 2926, 78 CONG. REC. 3443 (1934) (enacted).
200. See National Labor Relations Act of 1935 § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012).
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they have occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure of
collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full
freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of
representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the
terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or
protection.
21
This original purpose clause could certainly stay intact, but it could be
expanded to bring the Act into the twenty-first century to better reflect the
more modern global trends toward worker participation. Thus, an additional
clause could be added to that same preamble section that would read as
follows:
The Congress is also mindful of international developments in labor-
management relations and of the development of more collegial models
of employee/employer interaction in other countries and the attendant
benefits of such models. Such experiences have demonstrated that the
most efficient and effective way to keep America competitive in the global
economy of the 21s century is to draw upon the skills, experience and
expertise of the American worker. Accordingly, it is also the declared
policy of the United States to encourage workplace models that increase
communication between employees and management and to-provide
mechanisms for discussions between employees and management on
ways to improve the quality of product, efficiencies in production and
harmony in the workplace. So long as such mechanisms do not directly
interfere with the legitimate prerogatives of duly certified labor
organizations, or the freedom of employees to select representatives of
their own choosing, nothing in this Act shall consider such co-
determination models to be in violation of the law.
In addition to this declaration, language could be added creating
guidelines for the implementation of works councils within the context of
labor-management practices as fostered by the NLRA. These guidelines
could include approaches such as the following:
1. Alternative One
A clause could be added to Section 8(a)(5) and/or Section 9(a) that
allows an employer to deal with works councils on a wide range of mutual
concerns and not be guilty of bad-faith bargaining provided that the
committee action did not contravene a specific clause of any collective-
bargaining agreement in effect. The exclusive bargaining agent would have
201. Id.
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the right to negotiate over the effect of any committee decision adopted by
the employer that impacts wages, hours, and working conditions.
Because the "refusal to bargain" language of Section 8(a)(5)202 cross-
references Section 9(a), 203 it may be easiest o simply amend Section 9(a) as
follows:
Exclusive representatives; employees' adjustment of grievances directly
with employer[:]
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of
collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit
appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of
all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining
in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other
conditions of employment: Provided, That any individual employee or
a group of employees shall have the right at any time to present
grievances to their employer and to have such grievances adjusted,
without the intervention of the bargaining representative, as long as the
adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of a collective bargaining
contract or agreement then in effect: Provided further, That the
bargaining representative has been given opportunity to be present at
such adjustment.204
[Provided further, That the bargaining representative has been given
opportunity to be present at such adjustment.
Provided further, that nothing shall preclude the establishment of
employee committees or works councils and for employers to deal with
such committees for the purposes of enhancing workplace efficiency,
productivity, product quality or other matters of mutual interest so long
as such interaction does not otherwise interfere with employee rights to
select a representative of their own choosing.
In cases where employees are already represented by a labor
organization, employers and employee committees may implement
changes in working conditions to achieve their mutual goals so long as
such changes are not inconsistent with the terms of a collective-bargaining
contract or agreement hen in effect and provided further that any
bargaining representative has had the opportunity to review the proposed
202. Id. § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5).




changes before they are put into effect and, where necessary, bargain over
the impact of the changes.]
2. Alternative Two
A clause would be added to Section 8(a)(2),2°5 stating that employers
are fully authorized to establish works councils and worker committees, deal
with them, and establish policies and practices with them unless the totality
of the circumstances show that the employees may reasonably conclude that
they could not organize on their own or that management had thrust a
substitute for collective bargaining upon them. An additional requirement
in this section would be that employers must assure employees in writing of
their continued right to freely form a union. This posting would be designed
to assure employees that, despite the works councils dealing with wages,
hours, and working conditions, they as employees can still exercise their
traditional right to form a union.
One approach to do this could involve utilizing Member Raudabaugh's
four-part test for establishing unlawful domination from Electromation
20 6
and incorporating it into the Act. Thus, if this approach were used, the
definition of labor organization in Section 2(5) would remain the same,
20
but Section 8(a)(2)208 could be specifically modified by adding the following
to the current language:
In deciding whether or not an employer has violated this section in
cases where it has formed or interacts with employee committees that may
deal with bargainable subjects, the Board shall consider: (1) the extent of
the employer's involvement in the structure and operation of any
employee committee; (2) whether the employees, from an objective
standpoint, reasonably perceive the employee committee as a substitute
for.full collective bargaining through a traditional labor organization; (3)
whether employees have been assured of their Section 7 right to choose to
be represented by a traditional labor organization under a system of full
collective bargaining; and (4) the employer's motive in establishing or
dealing with the committee and whether it has been .formed in order to
impede the free choice of employees in selecting their own representatives.
205. See id. § 8(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2).
206. See Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990, 1013 (1992).
207. National Labor Relations Act of 1935 § 2(5), 29 U.S.C. § 152(5).
208. Id. § 8(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Global competitiveness is a requirement for U.S. employers. Works-
council practices appear to be a critical component of this evolving global
economy.2 9 The unique circumstances of U.S. labor law and the limitations
on the development of works-council practices given the interpretation of
the law has become an important issue to address.210 Higher education and
academic collective bargaining serves as an exceptional example, showing
that works councils and collective-bargaining processes can coexist.211 It is
imperative that consideration be given to the potential revision and
amendment of the National Labor Relations Act. There are numerous
approaches to consider. This Article, which has suggested three such
options, is intended to initiate further discussion of this topic and an
assessment of the options proposed.
209. See generally WADDINGTON, supra note 11, at 1 (describing the purpose of the
European Works Council).
210. See supra Part II.B.
211. See supra Part II.C.
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